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BRAVING THE NEW WORLD IN THE NINETIES
GERALD L. NEUMAN*
On Christmas Eve, 1492, Christopher Columbus wrecked his
flagship, the Santa Maria, on the north coast of Hispaniola. The
island has been in trouble ever since. Although the Spanish ini-
tially made it the center of their Caribbean imperial venture,
within a few decades their attention shifted westward to Mexican
treasures. The little island of Tortuga, off Hispaniola's northern
coast, became notorious as a base for pirates harrying the Spanish
fleet in the seventeenth century. The Spanish had lost control of
the western part of Hispaniola by the 1690s, and formally ceded it
to the French in the Treaty of Ryswick. This transfer was to have
fateful consequences.'
Over the course of the eighteenth century, French Saint-Dom-
ingue developed into a rich colony of sugar plantations, supported
by the labor of half a million black slaves. In the 1790s, the princi-
ples espoused in the French and American Revolutions unsettled
the structure of local authority on the island. The slaves, ex-slaves
and other free people of color of Saint-Domingue acted upon
these principles, overthrowing their colonial masters in a long and
bloody conflict. Ultimately, they established Haiti, the first inde-
pendent nation without slavery in the post-Columbian Western
Hemisphere.
The Haitians burst onto the pages of United States' immigra-
tion law even before their struggle for independence was won.
Several states of the mainland Republic imposed a quarantine on
West Indian blacks, slave or free-the potential bearers of dan-
* Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law. The author should disclose to
the reader that he has given advice to attorneys representing interdicted Haitians in con-
nection with cases cited herein, and was an author of the amicus curiae brief for the Inter-
national Rights Law Group in Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
T This account draws principally on C.L.R. JAMES. THE BLACK JACOBINs: TOUSSAINT
L'OuvERTURE AND THE SAN DOMINGO REVOLUTION (2d ed. 1963), FRANKLIN W. KNIGHT. THE
CARIBBEAN: THE GENESIS OF A FRAGMENTED NATIONALISM (2d ed. 1990), and THOMAS 0. OTT.
THE HAITIAN REVOLUTION, 1789-1804 (1973).
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gerously contagious ideas. In 1792, South Carolina was panicked
into suspending the slave trade altogether.' When it restored the
slave trade in 1803, it carefully barred the entry of any:
negro, mulatto, mustizo, or other person of colour, whether
bond or free . . . from the Bahama or West-India islands, or
from the continent of South-America; nor shall any negro or
person of colour, who heretofore hath been, or now is, or
hereafter shall be resident in any of the French West-India
islands, enter or be brought into this state from any part or
place without the limits thereof.'
In 1793, Georgia prohibited the importation of slaves "from
any of the West India, Windward, Leeward, or Bahama islands, or
from either of the adjacent provinces of East or West Florida,"
and required "all free negroes, mulattos, or mustizoes" seeking to
reside in the state to procure a certificate of "their honesty and
industry."' In 1795, North Carolina banned the bringing in of
people of color over the age of fifteen years "from any of the
West-India or Bahama Islands, or the settlements on the southern
coast of America.
' 6
The Southern States even persuaded the United States Con-
gress to enact a statute placing federal sanction behind their ex-
clusionary policies. 6 It prohibited vessels from bringing in foreign
blacks to any state in violation of local laws-this at a time when
Congress was powerless to prevent South Carolina from importing
slaves from Africa. The United States did not extend diplomatic
recognition to Haiti until 1862, when our own bloody civil war
eliminated the need for deference to slaveholder interests.
For the moment, let us skip over the 1890s and consider the
present. In 1992, the United States has been commemorating the
Columbian anniversary on location in the Caribbean, on Coast
Guard cutters, at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and at Port-au-
Prince, Haiti, by taking extraordinary measures to keep Haitians
S.C. Act of Dec. 21, 1792; see OTT, supra note i, at 53-54.
a S.C. Act of Dec. 17, 1803.
Ga. Act of Dec. 19, 1793.
N.C. Act of 1795, ch. 16, § 1.
Act of Feb. 28, 1803, ch. 63, 2 Stat. 205.
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away. The United States government has been intercepting boats
whose occupants are attempting to flee Haiti, taking the refugees
into custody, and detaining them either on the cutters or in camps
at Guantanamo, before forcibly returning most of them to Haiti.
The United States government has been engaged in "interdic-
tion" and repatriation of Haitian boat people since 1981." It sus-
pended repatriation for several weeks in the autumn of 1991, af-
ter a military coup ousted Haiti's President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, and unleashed a wave of violent repression against his
supporters.8 The United States government held interdicted Hai-
tians on shipboard and at Guantanamo.' But eventually the gov-
ernment's distaste for Haitians exceeded its disapproval of the
bloodshed. When renewal of repatriation was preliminarily en-
joined by a federal district court," the government quickly suc-
ceeded in having the district court's orders overturned by a di-
vided panel of the Eleventh Circuit." The Supreme Court then
denied certiorari, over Justice Blackmun's anguished dissent, and
the repatriations resumed.' After a second lawsuit resulted in a
second injunction,3 the President issued a new Executive Order,
rewriting the rules so that Haitians could be summarily repatri-
ated without any opportunity to demonstrate their refugee
status.'4
See Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1982): see also Executive Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 & 48,210 (1981), re-
printed in 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982).
' See Howard W. French, U.S. is Holding 200 Haitians on 2 Ships, N.Y. TiMxs, Nov. 8,
1991, at A3.
9 See id.: Al Kamen, Possible Haitian Refugee Flood Concerns Officials, WASH. POST, Nov. 16,
1991, at A24.
10 Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, No. 91-2653, 1991 WL 330942 (S.D. Fla. Nov.
19, 1991) (order granting preliminary injunction).
" Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1525 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 1245 (1992); Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1111 (11 th Cir.)
(dissolving injunction), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
" Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 112 S. Ct. 1245, 1246 (1992).
" Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-1258, 1992 WL 155853 (E.D.N.Y. Apr.
6, 1992) (preliminarily enjoining repatriation of Haitians detained at Guantanamo Bay Na-
val Base without access to legal counsel), affd in part, vacated in part, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d
Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992).
14 See Executive Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992). The Second Circuit
found this authorization to be in violation of statutory rights. See Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1352 (2d Cir.) (holding that government actions imple-
menting Executive Order were violative of Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
563
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Horrifying as the individual tragedies of the repatriation may
be, their horror is multiplied by the implications of the govern-
ment's legal defense for its exercise of power. The government
has contended that, when it captures Haitians on the high seas or
incarcerates them on an overseas naval base, it has caught them in
a limbo where they have no rights. 15 No right against repatriation
under the United Nations refugee convention, no constitutional
rights against United States government action, no rights of any
kind. Therefore the government can do as it pleases with them,
though it may choose to be generous.
People without rights: this was the theory of the conquistadors.
Later it was the theory of the slaveholders of Saint-Domingue,
who sought to keep the principles of the French Revolution out of
the French colonies. It reappeared in the antebellum South,
where the defenders of slavery scoffed at those who would naively
interpret the Declaration of Independence as recognizing inalien-
able rights in all mankind.
It is troublesome enough when the Executive Branch makes a
technical argument that a case involving the rights of citizens or
aliens overseas is nonjusticiable. Their rights are left to the good
judgment of bureaucrats or military officers, often without public-
ity and without supervision. But when the Executive Branch per-
suades itself that people have no rights, then even its internal delib-
erations will be guided only by considerations of self-interest or
partisan advantage.
Judge Herbert Stern described, in his memoir Judgment in Ber-
lin, the shock he felt when State Department lawyers maintained
that a criminal defendant tried before him in West Berlin had no
1253(h) (Supp. 1992)), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992). The Supreme Court however,
stayed the resulting injunction pending certiorari. See McNary v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 3 (1992) (staying injunction).
"5 See, e.g., Defendants' Response to Court's March 27, 1992 Order Directing Defend-
ants to Show Cause Why a Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue at 17-18, Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc. v. McNary, No. 92-1258, 1992 WL 155853 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 1992), rev'd in
part, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 52 (1992): Defendants' Memoran-
dum Opposing Injunctive Relief at 4, 18, 27-28, 78-79, Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v.
Baker, No. 91-2653, 1991 WL 330942 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 1991); see also Barbara Cross-
ette, U.S. Expanding Refugee Center As More Haitians Flee Homeland, NY. TiMEs, Dec. 3,
1991, at A6 ("In a rare appearance before a district court the Solicitor General of the
United States, Kenneth Starr, told Judge Clyde Atkins that Haitians stopped at sea while
trying to flee to the United States have no rights under American laws.").
564
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rights but those the State Department chose to afford him:
What would the Communists say when the Americans pro-
claimed that they ruled Berlin with dictatorial powers, to
keep it safe from Communism? What would the Berliners
think when the American authorities claimed that no Ber-
liner had any rights in occupied Berlin-in order to preserve
democracy in Berlin?
Who would ever believe, he wondered, that American law-
yers and diplomats would say such things? And in a place like
Berlin!
Thirty years ago this same American occupation govern-
ment-which now claimed to rule Berlin without legal re-
straint-had convicted German judges for proclaiming the
same doctrine, in the same city.1
Ultimately, the government's stance forced him into an attitude
of judicial activism, and Judge Stern ended up sentencing the de-
fendant to time served because otherwise there would be no guar-
antee that he would ever be released.
17
The Berlin case was unique, involving what technically re-
mained an occupied territory, although its residents were by then
citizens of one of the United States' staunchest allies. An attenu-
ated link to the war power clouded the situation. In the Haitian
cases, the government asserts that, in times of peace, it can reach
out onto the high seas to arrest people it suspects of attempting to
violate its immigration laws, and can hold them incommunicado
without any rights at all, so long as it prevents them from reach-
ing our territorial waters. The government also claims that the
Constitution, statutes, and international refugee laws do not for-
bid it to capture refugees anywhere in the world and hand them
over to their persecutors, so long as it acts outside its own bor-
ders.S This amazing assertion-which no court has ac-
"s HERBERT J. STERN. JUDGMENT IN BERLIN 98-99 (1984). The published opinion in the
case appears as United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979).
" See STERN, supra note 16, at 370 ("Gentlemen, I will not give you this defendant ....
You have persuaded me. I believe, now, that you recognize no limitations of due
process.").
s See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Smith, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11 th Cir.) (dissolv-
ing preliminary injunction against government from forceably repatriating Haitians in gov-
ernment custody), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992). In Smith, the panel majority decided
565
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cepted-sets a dreadful example for European governments at-
tempting to cope with unprecedented refugee flows from the
disintegrating Eastern bloc.
On what basis could such dehumanizing doctrines be defended?
Professor Paul Stephan has appropriately invoked Thomas Hob-
bes as the ideological godfather of this type of argument."0 For
Hobbes, the world began in a state of nature, which he described
as no "idyll" but as the "warre of every man against every
man. '" A commonwealth may be formed by a group of individu-
als coming together for their mutual protection and agreeing to
submit to a common sovereign. The sovereign's power over its
subjects is absolute, so long as the sovereign affords them a mini-
mal level of physical security. Nonparties to this social compact
remain in a state of nature vis-i-vis the commonwealth. The sov-
ereign's only constraint in dealing with nonparties is to comply
with agreements (if any) it voluntarily enters into. Otherwise, out-
siders are entirely at risk, for "the Infliction of what evill soever,
on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the benefit
of the Common-wealth, and without violation of any former Cove-
nant, is no breach of the Law of Nature."21
Hobbes did not flinch from recognizing the consequences of his
reasoning. The Hobbesian sovereign has no moral authority
outside its borders; foreigners have no obligation to respect its
laws; and its enforcement activities are actions of self-interested,
naked force. Internally, the sovereign is absolute, and the citi-
zens-more accurately, subjects-have hardly more rights than
the foreigners."
We invoke Hobbes at our peril.3 If we were consistent Hobbe-
only that the refugees' treaty rights were not judicially enforceable. Id. at 1110-11; see also
Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 815-16 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In Gracey, the
panel majority found that the plaintiff, an organization on the mainland, lacked standing to
assert the rights of refugees. Id.
"' See Paul B. Stephan III, Constitutional Limits on the Struggle Against International Terror-
ism: Revisiting the Rights of Overseas Aliens, 19 CONN. L. REV 83!, 850-56 (1987) (contrasting
Victorian and Hobbesian approaches to terrorism and torture of aliens).
10 THOMAS HOBBES. LEVIATHAN 188 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968).
2' Id. at 360.
" See Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 921-23, 984-85 (1991)
(describing Hobbes' social contract analysis and approach to extra-territorial action).
"' Certainly law professors do. See HoBBEs, supra note 20, at 350 ("Likewise in a Profes-
sor of the Law, to maintain any point, or do any act, that tendeth to the weakening of the
566
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sians, we would have to scrap the Constitution altogether and sub-
mit. Even if we could swallow the contradiction of being internal
Lockeans and external Hobbesians, the extraterritorial enforce-
ment of our laws would lose all moral legitimacy, and we would
have no argument but force or bribery to offer to other sover-
eigns when we object to their dealings with our own citizens or
other individuals. Moreover, it is not clear how we can swallow
the contradiction. How can we justify exercising sovereign power
over people to whom we afford no rights?
Which brings us to the 1890s. That was the decade of both the
world's Columbian Exposition and the Spanish-American War.
The latter established the United States as a Great Power with
colonial possessions of its own, including Puerto Rico. Partisans of
empire contended that the United States could acquire these pos-
sessions without bringing them under the protection of the Con-
stitution, and often invoked the racial superiority of Anglo-Saxons
as a justification for withholding rights from overseas populations.
Of course, in the post-Brown v. Board of Education, post-colonial
era, that particular method of self-delusion is no longer available.
In 1899, William Graham Sumner published an article in the
Yale Law Journal with the provocative title, The Conquest of the
United States by Spain. 4 He wrote:
Spain was the first, for a long time the greatest, of the mod-
ern imperialistic States. The United States, by its historical
origin, its traditions and its principles, is the chief representa-
tive of the revolt and reaction against that kind of a state. I
intend to show that, by the line of action now proposed to us,
which we call expansion and imperialism, we are throwing
away some of the most important elements of the American
symbol, and are adopting some of the most important ele-
ments of the Spanish symbol. We have beaten Spain in a mili-
tary conflict, but we are submitting to be conquered by her
on the field of ideas and policies. 5
As many are recalling in this anniversary year, scholarship over
Soveraign Power, is a greater Crime, than in another man.
". 8 YAI.F L.J. 168, 168 (1899).
15 Id.
567
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the past half-century has demonstrated how greatly United States'
practice contradicted United States' principle in the century pre-
ceding Sumner's article. But his point remains valid--the decision
to step into the shoes of Spain by acquiring its overseas colonies,
and denying them equal rights and status with the frontier territo-
ries of the continental United States, represented a new depar-
ture, doing further violence to the American constitutional
system.
A similar danger awaits the United States in the 1990s. Having
declared itself the victor in a Cold War against a totalitarian sys-
tem that regarded law as an instrument of revolutionary policy
and denied the constraint of fundamental human rights, the
United States faces a turbulent world in which it is, for the mo-
ment, the sole remaining "superpower." Without the orientation
of ideological alliances, this world has come to resemble the
Hobbesian state of nature. Long suppressed nationalisms rage in
the form of ethnic violence. The economic collapse of the Soviet
Union has broken dependency relationships with former clients,
which now may allow them to enjoy a buyer's market for weapons
of mass destruction.
Under these circumstances, a President whose primary interest
is foreign affairs, and a military and intelligence establishment
bent on preserving its Cold War budgets, together aspire to a
grand role as the military guarantor of a "new world order." The
United States is succumbing to the temptation to demand a free
hand with which to promote democratization, anti-terrorism, and
respect-by others-for human rights. Whether this results from
cynicism or from an arrogant faith in our own infallibility, it is
certain to lead to tragedy. The United States cannot foster human
rights and the rule of law while placing itself above them.
The dangers lurk at our doorstep as well as at a distance. The
victorious Western nations are also faced with the consequences of
the fall of the walls. After decades of demanding freedom of emi-
gration to the subjects of communism, their wish has been
granted. The United States experienced this irony in microcosm
in 1980, with the Mariel boatlift from Cuba. Deteriorating condi-
tions in former Communist countries are producing greater mi-
gratory pressures, both from economic deprivation and from eth-
568
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nic violence. With aid from Moscow cut off, Cuba itself may yet
again produce a similar exodus.
Neither the Constitution nor international law obliges the
United States to let these migrants enter. But if they end up in
United States' custody, other rights must become effective. The
Guantanamo episode demonstrates the fact that the Executive
Branch might pursue an offshore strategy, establishing extraterri-
torial refugee camps where it claims to govern without legal con-
straint. It is conceivable that the Rehnquist Court might abet such
evasions. The Chief Justice and his antiquarian colleague, Justice
Scalia, have shown a disposition to enforce premodern limits on
constitutional rights without concern for their contemporary justi-
fication.26 They have even expressed uncertainty about whether
"illegal aliens" within the United States have constitutional
rights"-a proposition that the Supreme Court of the 1890s
never doubted. 8 The 1990s will test whether the United States
can remain faithful to its principles. If our Constitution is wrecked
on a Caribbean shore, we will have only ourselves to blame.
"' See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, Il1 S. Ct. 2680, 2684 (1991) (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.); Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 11l S. Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991)
(Scalia, J., concurring): Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841,
2859 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 92
(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607 (1990)
(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.).
'7 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 272 (1990) (dictum).
See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (invalidating congressional
statute for violating Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of aliens unlawfully residing within
United States).
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